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Canadian and U.S. Antitrust Law - Areas of Overlap Between
Antitrust and Import Relief Laws
by Mark R. Gillen*
Lawson A. W. Hunter**
Douglas E. Rosenthal***
W. Todd Miller****
I. ANTITRUST LAW
A. Price Discrimination
price discrimination generally involves charging customers different
prices by differentiating between groups of customers. Laws which
prohibit certain forms of price discrimination fall into one of the most
criticized areas of antitrust law. The criticism is based on the concern
that the law promotes fairness or equality of treatment, rather than eco-
nomic efficiency and aggressive buying behavior by purchasers. The con-
cern is that the law has an anticompetitive, rather than a procompetitive
effect.
1. Canadian Law on Price Discrimination
Section 34(1)(a) of the Competition Act prohibits certain forms of
price discrimination. This section, unlike its companion sections 34(l)(b)
and (c), governs that relationship between suppliers and buyers. It is
therefore a vertical price discrimination section and is not concerned
with horizontal discrimination.
Section 34(l)(a) provides that every one engaged in a business who
is a party or privy to, or assists in, any sale that discriminates to his
knowledge, directly or indirectly, against competitors of a purchaser of
articles from him in that any discount, rebate, allowance, price conces-
sion or other advantage granted to the purchaser over and above any
discount, rebate, allowance, price concession or other advantage that,
at the time the articles are sold to such purchaser, is available to such
competitors in respect of a sale of articles of like quality and quantity;
is guilty of an indictable offense and is liable to imprisonment for two
years.
Section 34(2) creates a defense to price discrimination. It reads as
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follows: "It is not an offense under paragraph (1)(a) to be a party or
privy to, or assist in any sale mentioned therein unless the discount, re-
bate, allowance, price concession or other advantage was granted as part
of a practice of discriminating as described in that paragraph."
Similarly Section 34(3) creates special rules for cooperative societies.
It reads as follows:
Paragraph (1)(a) should not be construed to prohibit a co-operative
association, credit union, caisse populaire or co-operative credit society
from returning to its members, suppliers or customers, the whole or
any part of the net surplus made in its operations in proportion to the
acquisition or supply of articles from or to such members, suppliers or
customers.
There are elements to the price discrimination offense created by the
law. They are the requirements of: being engaged in business; being a
party or privy to, or assisting in a discriminatory sale; knowledge; dis-
crimination among competing purchasers; the purchase of articles, not
services; discrimination on the basis of a discount, rebate, allowance,
price concession or other advantage; discrimination in sales being made
at the same time; the availability of the price concession to other pur-
chasers; like quality and quantity; and discrimination as part of a
practice.
Although there has been considerable discussion of the price dis-
crimination provisions of the Competition Act, there have not been a
significant number of cases brought to trial.' Because of its practical sig-
nificance in the day-to-day operation of business, however, probably
I There have only been four cases initiated by the government under the price discrimination
law. Regina v. Mary Maxim Knitting Wool, an unreported decision of the Exchequer Court of
Canada in 1968, resulted in a prohibition order along the lines recommended by a report of the
Restrictive Trade Practices Commission. The case of Regina v. The Hobart Manufacturing Com-
pany Limited, involving five counts of price discrimination, was dismissed at the preliminary hearing
in 1980. It is unreported. In December, 1981, an Information alleging a violation of section 43(l)(a)
was laid against Neptune Motors Limited. The accused was committed to stand trial, but the de-
fendant pleaded guilty in June, 1986, and was fined $50,000. A prohibition order was also issued.
The last government prosecution involved Simmons Ltd. They were charged with two counts of
price discrimination on November 17, 1983. On October 15, 1984, Simmons pleaded guilty and was
fined $30,000. A prohibition order was issued and the company was required to provide the Direc-
tor under the Combines Act, for three years, with a detailed description of any company plans
relating to rebates.
There are three private actions involving the price discrimination section. The first case, Direct
Lumber Co. Ltd. v. Western Plywood Co. Ltd., 1962 S.C.R. 646, was dismissed on the basis that no
independent civil cause of action existed. Malo v. Shell Oil Company of Canada Ltd., 1965 C.S. 197
(1965) a 1965 decision of the Quebec Superior Court was dismissed. The third case is the 1985
decision of the British Columbia Superior Court in 57134 Manitoba Ltd. v. Palmer, Smith Paper
Ltd. et. al. The court in this case found that the price discrimination section of the Combines Act
had been violated, although the discrimination issue was incidental to the main issues at stake.
An excellent review of the law is the article Nozick, The Regulation of Price Discrimination
under the Combines Investigation Act, 54 CAN. BAR REV. 309 (1976).
Vol. 12:39 1987
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more legal attention is paid to this section than any other provision of the
Act. There are five significant reasons for the attention.
First, the section only applies to the sale of articles. Unlike the rest
of the Combines Act, the price discrimination provisions do not apply to
the sale of services. The rationale for excluding services from the provi-
sions when the Act was extended to cover the service sector in 1976, was
the difficulty in applying the notion of quality and quantity to services.
Although this may be true in some service sectors, it equally may not be
true in others, such as transportation.
Second, the section, in addition to the criminal obligation of proving
mens rea, explicitly requires that the person engaged in the discrimina-
tion have knowledge of the fact that he is discriminating. This require-
ment has the most significance in shielding sellers from violating the Act
if they are unaware that buyers are in competition with one another.
Third, the section deals only with discrimination between competing
purchasers. The government has enforced the law as applying only to
purchasers in competition with each other at their level of trade. They
have not attempted to argue that all purchasers from a particular sup-
plier are in competition for the purchase of the articles in question. The
government has confined its enforcement to purchasers engaged in the
same business in the same market.
Fourth, the most important basis for discrimination under the law is
discrimination on the basis of quantity. The law permits sellers to dis-
criminate if they are selling to different purchasers in different quantities.
The quantity requirement does not mean that the seller must be able to
cost justify the lower price he is giving to the purchaser who makes the
larger volume purchases. The fact that discrimination is permissible on
the basis of quantity has meant that large purchasers have gained advan-
tages over their smaller purchasers. This in turn has led smaller purchas-
ers to form joint buying groups to take advantage of volume rebates.
Fifth, the law requires that the discrimination be part of a practice
of discrimination. This means that isolated incidents of discrimination,
such as promotional discounts or time-limited discounts, will be permit-
ted in order to meet competition. The government does not interpret the
practice requirement of the law as permitting a generalized meeting com-
petition defense. The fact that there is no meeting competition defense in
the law has made it very difficult for sellers to engage in what would
often be seen as healthy procompetitive activities.
There are other important consequences of the price discrimination
law which need to be noted. First, it is not entirely clear whether the
section applies to buyers as well as sellers. Those who argue that the law
reaches buyers look at the words of the Act which state that everyone
who is party orprivy to or assists in a sale may commit the offense. It has
been argued that if a buyer is privy to knowledge that the seller is dis-
criminating against other buyers, or if he assists either through encour-
3
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agement or other means, then he may be caught by the section. Running
against that view are the words of the section which say that the discrim-
ination must be against competitors of a purchaser of articles from him.
The underlined words would seem to refer only to a seller and would not
include a buyer.
It has also been suggested that a buyer who encouraged a practice of
discrimination could be found guilty of the offense of aiding and abetting
the commission of an offense under the Criminal Code.2 However, in the
final analysis, the law clearly speaks most directly to sellers and the gov-
ernment has never made any attempt to enforce the law against buyers.
Another issue that is raised by the section is whether it applies to
purchases where the buyer is not just engaging in the resale of the arti-
cles. In other words, does the section apply if the buyer uses the
purchased article as an input to the production of another product? The
words of the Act would appear to cover such a situation, although there
have been no cases pursued on such a theory.3 A seller might well be
able to rely on the "knowingly" requirement of the section to defend
himself against such a charge since he may well not know whether his
purchasers are in competition with each other.
Another important issue covered by the law is the question of vol-
ume incentive programs. The position of the government, which led to a
conviction in the Simmons case, is that it is not permissible for a supplier
to institute an incentive program whereby a purchaser obtains a percent-
age rebate if he increases his sales by a certain amount over that in a
previous accounting period. This has been held to be illegal if the end
result is sales of the same quantity at different prices to different buyers.
Finally, the treatment of functional discounts under the law is im-
portant. The Director's Office has usually taken the position that a dif-
ferent price that is based on the buyer performing special functions, such
as central warehousing, is not permissible.4 An issue that has not been
tested is whether it is justifiable to sell an article that is combined with a
service to thereby avoid the section. The argument would be that the
combination of article and pre- or post-sale service creates a product dis-
tinguishable from the article alone. If this argument is sustainable, it
could create a kind of functional discount defense. Of course, since sec-
tion 34(1)(a) does not cover services, it is arguable that the section would
not apply in any event.
There are many other technical questions which relate to the opera-
tion of the price discrimination section, but those noted above are proba-
bly the most significant from a commercial viewpoint.
2 See the discussion of this point in G. KAISER, WORLD LAW OF COMPETITION, Unit A,
North America, Volume A3, Canada, at section 4.02(9).
3 D.H.W. Henry discusses this issue in a speech he gave as Director of Investigation and Re-
search to the Etobicoke Industrial Association on February 20, 1962.
4 Id.
Vol. 12:39 1987
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Section 34(1)(b) provides that every one engaged in a business who
engages in a policy of selling products in any area of Canada at prices
lower than those exacted by him elsewhere in Canada, having the effect
or tendency of substantially lessening competition or eliminating a
competitor in such part of Canada, or designed to have such effect...
is guilty of an indictable offense and is liable to imprisonment for two
years.
The elements are therefore: (i) sales of the same product in different
places in Canada; (ii) sales at different prices in one place compared to
prices in another place; (ii) a policy of selling at these different prices;
and (iv) the effect or tendency or intent to have the effect or tendency of
substantially lessening competition or eliminating a competitor. Section
2 defines product such that it includes both goods and services.
With respect to sales of the same product in different places in Can-
ada, there is very little judicial comment on what constitutes an area of
Canada. In Regina v. Carnation Co. Ltd.,' the accused admitted selling
at higher prices in Ontario than in Alberta and British Columbia, and the
question of an area of Canada was not discussed. It has been suggested
that an "area" would have to provide a distinct enough market to avoid a
loss of sales from a supplier's high price outlet to his own low price out-
let.6 Also it is arguable that in interpreting the words elsewhere in Can-
ada, it must be shown that the lower price is lower than the level of price
generally charged elsewhere in Canada. In other words, an identical
lower price charged in several places against an identical higher price
charged in several other places might not constitute an offense since there
are prices charged elsewhere in Canada that are identical to the lower
price.' Presumably, the relevant prices are effective prices, net of rebates,
bonuses, allowances, discounts and the like. Delivery charges would also
presumably be taken into account.8
The question of what amounts to an effect or tendency or a design to
have an effect or tendency to substantially lessen competition is dealt
with in the following section of this paper on predatory pricing.
Although section 34(1)(b) does not require that unreasonably low prices
be shown but only that there be different prices in different areas of Can-
ada it may, nevertheless, be useful to show that the prices in the lower
price area are unreasonably low in order to demonstrate a design to
lessen competition substantially or eliminate a competitor.
Section 34(1) creates an indictable criminal offense. Anyone con-
victed of the offense is liable to imprisonment for two years. In the case
5 Regina v. Carnation Co. Ltd., 4 D.L.R.3d 133,58 C.P.R. 112, 1970 3 C.C.C. 190 (Aita. C.A.)
(1969).
6 C.J.M. FLAVELL, CANADIAN COMPETrION LAW: A BUSINESS GUIDE, (1979), 221.
7 Id. at 222.
8 Id.
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of a corporation, this would authorize a judge to fine the corporation an
amount in its discretion. In addition, section 30(1) of the Act authorizes
a court, on conviction, to issue a prohibition order to prevent the contin-
uation or repetition of the offense or anything directed towards the com-
mission of the offense. Section 30(2) of the Act basically authorizes a
court, prior to obtaining a conviction, to issue a prohibition order to pre-
vent the commission of an offense.
Section 31(1) of the Act allows a court, where any person is con-
victed of a criminal offense under the Act, to require a person, for a
period of not more than three years, to submit information with respect
to his business as the court deems advisable. This section is used to allow
the government to monitor the behavior of the company and ensure that
is does not continue to violate the law. This information disclosure re-
quirement was used recently in the Simmons case. Finally, any person
who has suffered damages as a result of a price discrimination offense can
sue to recover those damages under section 31.1 of the Act.
Although section 34(1)(a) is an extremely important law for most
sellers in the economy, and is a subject of much advice by lawyers, it has
not been aggressively enforced by the government over the years.9 This
may be because either it is difficult to prove the necessary elements of an
offense or because the government has not been convinced of the impor-
tance of the section that promotes competition. There have been no con-
victions under section 34(1)(b).
2. U.S. Law on Price Discrimination
In the United States, section 2 of the Clayton Act, amended by the
Robinson-Patman Act,10 generally prohibits discrimination in prices,
services, or facilities. The most frequently used section, section 2(a)
makes it unlawful for
any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such commerce...
to discriminate in price between different purchasers of commodities of
like grade and quality . . . where the effect may be substantially to
lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of com-
merce, or to injure, destroy, or prevent competition ....
Thus, it is apparent that the elements of a price discrimination claim are:
(1) a purchase in commerce, (2) a discrimination in the prices charged by
the seller, (3) two different purchasers, (4) of commodities, (5) of like
grade and quality, and (6) that causes competitive injury. In a private
claim, currently more common than Government enforcement, there is
also a further requirement of proof of direct injury to plaintiff proxi-
mately caused by the violation. While the Robinson-Patman Act may be
enforced criminally as a misdemeanor by the Justice Department, no
9 See supra note 1.
10 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1982).
Vol. 12:39 1987
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such enforcement has taken place for many years. Future criminal en-
forcement is unlikely.
Section 2(a) requires that the person be "engaged in commerce" and
charge discriminatory prices "in the course of such commerce," in addi-
tion to the requirement that "either or any of the purchases involved in
such discrimination" be "in commerce."'" If proof is given on the issue
of either purchase being involved in commerce, the other commerce re-
quirements are necessarily true.'2 The requirement that at least one sale
be in commerce can be satisfied only if one of the sales being compared
actually crosses a state line.' 3 Thus, the reach of the Robinson-Patman
Act is not as extensive as the Sherman Act. In Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp
Paving Co., 14 the Court rejected the argument that the transactions in-
volved were interstate because they had a nexus to interstate commerce.
In order to violate section 2(a), it is necessary that there be some
discrimination in the prices charged by a seller. In FTC v. Anheuser-
Busch, Inc.,15 the Supreme Court stated that a price discrimination is
merely a price difference. The courts will attempt to determine the ac-
tual net prices paid, after deducting discounts, rebates, surcharges, and
other factors that alter the net price.16 An additional element in finding
discrimination is that the sales which are compared must be reasonably
contemporaneous.17 Thus it is not to say that a seller is inflexibly bound
to continue to charge the same prices, but he may change prices from
time to time as long as those who purchase at roughly the same time are
treated equally.
A discrimination under section 2(a) requires at least two sales trans-
actions.' 8 Thus, a sale at one price and a mere offer to sell at a higher
price, or a sale and a refusal to sell or other combinations which do not
involve two sales, do not come within section 2(a). Section 2(a) does not
apply to discriminations in transactions that are not sales-such as leases
of real estate-to licenses, to agency arrangements, etc.
Section 2(a) prohibits discrimination only in sales of commodities.
The Act uses the words commodities almost interchangeably with words
such as goods, products, and wares or merchandise."' The Act does not
apply to leases of realty, to the licensing of the right to exhibit movies, to
11 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1982).
12 See, e.g., Lehrman v. Gulf Oil Corp., 464 F.2d 26, 36-37 (5th Cir.) cert. denied 409 U.S. 1077
(1972).
13 See Bacon v. Texaco, Inc., 503 F.2d 946 (5th Cir. 1974), (per curiam), cert, denied, 420 U.S.
10005 (1975).
14 Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186 (1974).
Is FTC v. Anheuser Busch, Inc., 363 U.S. 536 (1960).
16 See Indian Coffee Corp. v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 482 F. Supp. 1104 (W.D. Pa. 1980).
(Consumer coupons are not an element of prices to retailers.)
17 See Bruce's Juices, Inc. v. American Can Co., 330 U.S. 743, (1947).
18 Bruce's Juices, 330 U.S. at 755.
19 15 U.S.C. §§ 13(a), (d), (1982).
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licenses under patents, to the lending of money, or to other similar trans-
actions which involve intangibles.
Discriminatory prices on commodities of unlike grade and quality
are not unlawful under the Robinson-Patman Act.20 In the seminal case
of FTC v. Borden Co., the Supreme Court upheld a finding that brand
names and labels are not determinants of grade and quality. In this case,
Borden had charged lower prices for its private-label evaporated milk
than for its otherwise indistinguishable Borden brand evaporated milk.
The Court rejected the argument that the Borden brand was of a differ-
ent grade because of significant consumer preference and the regulatory
framework in which it sold at a higher price. The Supreme Court held
that grade and quality are to be determined "by the characteristics of the
product itself."2 Since Borden, the cases suggest that bona fide physical
differences which affect marketability, even though small and having lit-
tle or no effect on a seller's costs, should be sufficient to cause products
not to be of like grade and quality.22
As is true of many of the trade laws, the Robinson-Patman Act does
not prohibit all price discrimination; but only discrimination that has an
adverse effect on competition. The requisite injury to competition may
occur at the level of the sellers' competitors, primary line injury; at the
level of the seller's disfavored customers who compete with the seller's
favorite customers, second line injury; and so on.23 It is important to
note that while section 2(a) prohibits price discrimination-the effect of
which may be to lessen competition substantially-section 4 of the Clay-
ton Act,24 requires that a plaintiff must show actual injury as a result of
the violation of section 2(a) in order to prevail in a private treble damage
suit.
As to primary line injury, some courts have held that the competi-
tive injury requirement can be met either by actual evidence of injury to
competition at the seller's level or by showing that the price discrimina-
tion was carried out with predatory intent, from which it can be inferred
that injury to competition may result. 5 Predatory intent has been found
on the basis of a course of conduct that evidences such intent, or has been
inferred from evidence of predatory below cost sales.26 Findings of com-
petitive injury also have been based on a competing seller's loss of cus-
tomers and its financial crippling due to price reductionY The FTC,
20 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1982).
21 FTC v. Borden Co., 383 U.S. 637, 641 (1966).
22 See William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 461 F. Supp. 410, 421
(N.D. Cal. 1978), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 668 F.2d 1014 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 103 S. Ct. 58 (1982).
23 See Perkins v. Standard Oil Co., 395 U.S. 642 (1969).
24 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1982).
25 See FTC v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 363 U.S. 536 (1960).
26 Anheuser-Busch, 363 U.S. at 536.
27 Dean Milk Co. v. FTC, 395 F.2d 96 (7th Cir. 1968).
Vol. 12:39 1987
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taking a view criticized by the courts, may also take into account diver-
sion of business whereby injury is found when customers are diverted
from the plaintiff to the seller by the lower price.28
For a secondary line competitive injury, the courts and the FTC
require that evidence go beyond merely showing the existence of a price
difference.29 Generally, in order for there to be substantial injury to com-
petition at the customer level, there must be competition between favored
and unfavored customers or between their customers. In the Falls City
case, the Supreme Court held that "injury to competition is established
prima facie by proof of substantial price discrimination between compet-
ing purchasers over time."3 The inference test, affirmed by the Court in
Falls City, is used often when there is substantial discriminatory pricing
between customers who are highly competitive with one another and op-
erate on low profit margins.3" Decisions which do not infer injury to
competition from a price differential have often turned on a finding that
the price differential was not sufficiently substantial in light of the cir-
cumstances to cause substantial injury to competition.32
There are a number of statutory defenses to a section 2(a) price dis-
crimination claim.33 Discriminatory prices otherwise unlawful are defen-
sible under section 2(b) of the act when the seller acts "in good faith to
meet an equally low price of a competitor."34 The meeting competition
defense is an absolute defense to an otherwise prohibited discrimina-
tion.35 The FTC set forth the applicable standard of good faith as fol-
lows: "[t]his is a flexible and pragmatic, not a technical or doctrinaire
concept. The standard of good faith is simply the standard of the pru-
dent business man responding fairly to what he reasonably believes is a
situation of competitive necessity." The Supreme Court has held that the
test for determining whether defendant has a valid meeting competition
defense is whether the seller can show "the existence of facts which
would lead a reasonable and prudent person to believe that the granting
of a lower price would, in fact, meet the equally low price of a
competitor."36
A second defense is the cost justification defense, under which price
differentials otherwise unlawful are permitted when such differentials
"make only due allowance for differences in the cost of manufacture,
28 Lloyd A. Frye Roofing Co., 68 FTC 217, 260 (1965), affid, 371 F.2d 277 (7th Cir. 1966).
29 See, eg., Falls City Industries, Inc. v. Vamco Beverage, Inc., 103 S. Ct. 1282, 1288 (1983).
30 Id.
31 See Beatrice Foods Co., 76 FTC 719 (1969), affid sub nom. Kroger Co. v. FTC, 438 F.2d
1372 (6th Cir.), cerL denied, 404 U.S. 871 (1971).
32 FTC v. Sun Oil Co., 371 U.S. 5050, 527 (1963).
33 15 U.S.C. § 13(b) (1982).
34 See Shell Oil Co. v. Younger, 580 2nd F.2d 34 (9th Cir. 1978), cert denied, 440 U.S. 947
(1979).
35 See Falls City, 103 S.Ct. 1282 (1983). See Continental Baking Co., 63 FTC 2071, 2163
(1963).
36 U.S. v. J.I. Case, Inc., 438 U.S. 422, 451 (1978).
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sale, or delivery resulting from the differing methods or quantities" in
which the goods are "sold or delivered."'37 The plaintiff has the burden
of proving that a price differential is justified.
Since the Borden and Bowman cases, it has been very difficult to use
successfully the cost justification defense.38 These cases have reduced
difficulty in finding an acceptable cost study to prove the cost differential.
Section 2(a) of the Clayton Act also allows a changing conditions
defense. Section 2(a) provides:
Nothing herein contained shall prevent price changes from time to
time wherein response to changing conditions effecting the market for
or marketability of the goods concerned, such as but not limited to
actual or imminent deterioration of perishable goods, obsolescence of
seasonal goods, distress sales under court process, or sales in good faith
in discontinuance of business and the goods concerned.39
Proof of changing conditions constitutes a complete defense to an
alleged section 2(a) violation. Some cases have intimated that various
changes in the market are a defense,' but the holdings in other cases
have suggested that the available defenses are only those similar to those
listed in the statute.41
A functional discount may be allowed where the discount relates to
additional services which are provided by the buyer and where the buyer
does indeed perform those services with respect to the purchases for
which he receives the discount.42 The position with respect to incentive
discounts is not clear.43 Incentive discounts may, however, be allowed
where they do not cause competitive injury.
3. Comparison of Canadian and U.S. Laws on Price
Discrimination
There are some differences in the Canadian and U.S. laws with re-
spect to price discrimination which affect their overlap with import relief
laws and the degree to which they can substitute for import relief laws.
In the United States, pursuant to section 2 of the Clayton Act as
37 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1982).
38 United States v. Borden Co., 370 U.S. 460 (1962); United States v. Bowman Dairy Co., Id.
(single opinion for both cases).
39 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1982).
40 See Marty's Floor Covering, Co. v. GAF Corp., 604 F.2d 266, 270 (4th Cir. (1979), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 1017 (1980).
41 See, eg., Moore v. Meade Service Co., 190 F.2d, 541 (10th Cir. 1951) cert. denied, 342 U.S.
902 (1952).
42 See, e.g., Doubleday and Co., 52 F.T.C. 169 (1955); Mueller Co., 60 F.T.C. 120 (1962) affd.
1963 Trade Cases 70,880, 323 F.2d 44 (7th Cir. 1963); Boise Cascade Corp., 1986 Trade Cases
1 22,330.
43 See, e.g., J. Truett Payne Co. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 451 U.S. 557 (1981) where there was
a question of incentive discounts but the Supreme Court found there was not sufficient evidence
before the Federal District Court to support a finding of a violation of the Robinson-Patman Act.
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amended by the Robinson-Patman Act, there must be discrimination
"where the effect may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to
create a monopoly in any line of commerce, or to injure, destroy, or pre-
vent competition ... ." Section 34(1)(a) of the Canadian Competition
Act has no such effect on the competition test.
The United States has a cost justification test while the Canadian
law requires sales of like quantities. The cost justification test is hard to
prove and thus tends to rigidify prices where sellers were trying to avoid
a price discrimination violation. The quantity test used in Canada is eas-
ier to apply and should track costs fairly well, thus approximating a cost
justification test without the difficulties inherent in proving a cost
justification.
The United States has a meeting competition defense which is not
specifically available under the Canadian law. It may be, however, that if
a seller has to meet the competition with respect to one purchaser, but
not with respect to another, then those purchasers may not be competing
purchasers and thus the seller would not be in violation of section
34(l)(a) of the Canadian Competition Act.
The price discrimination provisions in the United States can be used
to attack primary line injury. Section 34(1)(a) of the Canadian Competi-
tion Act cannot be used for this purpose although an action for primary
line injury may be available under section 34(l)(b) or (c).
As discussed above, incentive discounts can result in a violation of
the Canadian price discrimination law. Incentive discounts may, how-
ever, be an acceptable basis for discriminations in price in the United
States. Also, as discussed above, functional discounts (discounts for per-
forming special functions, such as warehousing) may well not be permis-
sible under Canadian price discrimination law but are permissible under
the U.S. law.
In summary, the differences are a lessening of competition defense
provided in the United States but not in Canada; a cost justification test
in the United States as opposed to a like quantity test in Canada; a meet-
ing the competition defense in the United States as opposed to a possibly
similar effect in the Canadian law; the availability of the price discrimina-
tion provisions for attacking primary line injury in the United States;
and, the differences in permitting incentive and functional discounts.
B. Predatory Pricing
Predatory pricing involves an attempt to injure or remove a compet-
itor by pricing at a level low enough to drive the competitor out of the
market. Predatory pricing is often referred to as primary line price dis-
crimination in that its injurious effect is directed towards persons at the
same level of production or distribution.
The economic rationale for prohibiting predatory or primary line
price discrimination is to maintain competition by preventing the lessen-
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ing or elimination of competition by selling at prices that might force
competitors out of the market or discourage entry into the market. The
driving out of existing rivals is known as classical predation.' The no-
tion of classical predation, as expressed in Hoffmann-La Roche,45 in-
volves a predator who drives a competitor out of business by selling at
very low prices and then subsequently increases the price to more than
compensate for the loss that results from the period of low prices. The
pre-emption or deterrence upon entry to the market by adopting low
prices is known as strategic predation.46
There is some doubt as to whether predatory pricing can exist; or if
it does exist, it is argued that it is so rare as not to be of importance in
competition policy.47 The existence of predatory pricing seems doubtful
since it would require sufficient entrance barriers to allow an increased
price that is high enough to recoup the losses from the predatory pricing.
There may often be less costly methods, such as acquisition, to remove a
competitor. However, it has been suggested that predation in one geo-
graphic market may be effective and profitable as a threat to deter entry
in other markets.4"
1. Canadian Law on Predatory Pricing
Subsection 34(l)(c) of the Act prohibits engagement in predatory or
so-called primary line price discrimination (that is, price discrimination
directed at rival sellers). Subsection 34(1)(c) prohibits sales at unreason-
ably low prices that have the effect or tendency or are designed to have
the effect or tendency of substantially lessening competition or eliminat-
ing a competitor.
Section 34(l)(c) provides that every one engaged in a business who
engages in a policy of selling products at prices unreasonably low, hav-
ing the effect or tendency of substantially lessening competition or
eliminating a competitor, or designed to have such effect, is guilty of an
indictable offense and is liable to imprisonment for two years.
The elements of the offense are that: (1) one be engaged in a busi-
ness; (2) one be engaged in a policy of selling products; (3) at unreasona-
bly low prices; and (4) having the effect or tendency or designed to have
the effect or tendency of substantially lessening competition or eliminat-
ing a competitor.49
44 McFetidge and Wong, Predatory Pricing in Canada: The Law and the Economics 63(4)
CAN. B. REv. 685 at 703 (1985).
45 Regina v. Hoffman-La Roche, 28 O.R. 2d 164 at 192.
46 See McFetidge & Wong supra note 42, at 703.
47 McGee, Predatory Pricing Revisited 23 J. LAW & EcONOMIcs 289 at 294 (1980).
48 Posner, Exclusionary Practices and the Antitrust Laws 41 U. CHI. L. REv. 506 (1974).
49 See Regina v. Hoffmann-La Roche, 28 O.R. 2d 164 at 193-213, 14 C.R. 3d 289,48 C.P.R. 2d
145, 55 C.C.C. 2d 1, 109 D.L.R. 3d 5 (1980), affid. 33 O.R. 2d 694, 24 C.R. 3d 193, 58 C.P.R. 2d 1,
62 C.C.C. 2d 118, 125 D.L.R. 3d 607 (C.A. 1981).
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The term "engaged in a business" has not been subject to much judi-
cial comment. It has not been in issue in cases which deal with section
34(1) and thus is presumably a rather straightforward element to show.
It was held in Regina v. Producers Dairy Ltd. that to show that the
alleged predatory pricing is part of a policy requires more than a short-
term reaction to the actions of competitors5 0 In Regina v. Hoffmann-La
Roche, two six-month periods of supplying drugs to hospitals for free was
found to constitute a policy. 1 It was also noted in Hoffmann-La Roche
that to come within the word policy, all that is required "is a planned
and deliberate course of conduct by responsible employees of the
company." 52
In relation to the offense of discriminatory pricing under subsection
34(l)(a), subsection 34(2) requires that for there to be an offense under
subsection 34(l)(a), there must be a practice of discriminating. The
meaning of the word practice in subsection 34(2) may be of use in inter-
preting policy in subsections 34(l)(b) and (C).1 3 D.H. Henry, a former
Director of Investigation and Research, in considering the word practice,
suggested that "meeting spot competition, giving a store-opening special,
an anniversary special or a stock clearance special, all of which might be
described in trade terms as a 'one shot' effort, would not give rise to an
inquiry under the Act.' 54
It appears then that the existence of a policy depends on the length
of time over which sales are made and the frequency of sales. A one shot
or brief effort will not constitute a policy.
On the word selling, it is noteworthy that Judge Linden in Hoff-
mann-La Roche found that giveaways by Hoffmann-La Roche did con-
stitute selling since the giveaways were "part of a commercial operation,
not a charitable one. ' 55
The question of an unreasonably low price was dealt with in Hoff-
mann-La Roche, and in Regina v. Consumers Glass. 6 In Hoffmann-La
Roche the trial judge listed four factors that must be considered in deter-
mining whether a price is unreasonably low: the difference between the
production cost or accounting cost and the sale price; the length of time
during which sales at the questionable prices take place; the circum-
stances of the sales such as whether a price cut is defensive in response to
a competitor's actions or proposed actions; and, whether any long-term
50 Regina v. Producers Dairy Ltd., 50 C.P.R. 2d 265 at 270-71 (Ont. C.A. 1981).
51 Regina v. Hoffman-La Roche, 28 O.R. 2d 164 at 213.
52 Id. at 194.
53 See the discussion of the word "practice" in the discussion of Price Discrimination earlier in
this Part C.
54 Henry, D.H.W., Unfair Distribution and Pricing Practices, Law Soc. of Upper Canada Spe-
cial Lectures - Trade Competition, 1, 43, 44 (1963).
55 28 O.R. 2d 164 at 196.
56 Regina v. Consumers Glass Co., 33 O.R. 2d 228, 14 B.L.R. 172, 60 C.C.C. 2d 481, 124
D.L.R. 3d 274 (H.C. 1981).
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economic benefits will accrue to the seller by reducing its prices below
cost.17 Unfortunately, Judge Linden did not define production cost or
accounting cost.
With respect to the difference between the cost and the sale price,
the judge stated that if an article is sold for more than production or
accounting cost, it can never be held to be unreasonable." If an article is
sold for less than cost, this may or may not be held to be unreasonable.5 9
In Consumers Glass, it was held that a price cannot be said to be unrea-
sonably low, regardless of the intent behind the pricing policy, if the
price charged is greater than the average variable cost and there is no
suggestion that the price is below the marginal cost.6 0 Variable costs
vary with changes in output and average variable cost is the sum of varia-
ble costs divided by output. Marginal cost is the increment to total cost
that results from producing an additional increment of output.61
The court in Consumers Glass quoted extensively from an article by
Areeda and Turner that suggests that sales below marginal cost are un-
reasonably low but that given the difficulties in calculating marginal
costs, average variable costs would have to be used as a proxy. 62 Unfor-
tunately, what constitutes a variable cost and assessing to which units a
variable cost applies are not always easy matters to determine. Conse-
quently, the determination of average variable costs is not necessarily
straightforward and there may often be a range of arguably reasonable
average variable costs. Therefore, either the test may not be helpful in a
number of situations or, in attempting to apply the test, the court may
end up having to assess arbitrarily the average variable cost at some
amount within a range set by expert evidence.
In summary, the cases indicate that a price will probably not be
found to be unreasonably low if it is above the average variable cost of
the item sold. If the price is below the average variable cost, then the
factors set out in Hoffmann-La Roche will be considered to determine
whether the price is unreasonably low.
As noted above, section 34(l)(c) requires that a policy of selling at
unreasonably low prices must also be shown to have the effect or ten-
dency or be designed to have the effect or tendency of substantially les-
sening competition or eliminating a competitor. One must then show
either that there was an actual effect or tendency to lessen competition
substantially or eliminate a competitor, or that there was a design to have
57 28 O.R. 2d 164 at 200-201.
58 Id. at 200.
59 Id.
60 Consumers Glass, 33 O.R.2d at 255.
61 These definitions of variable costs and marginal costs are noted in Areeda and Turner, Pred-
atory Pricing and Related Practices Under Section 2 of The Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L. REv. 697-733
(1975) and were quoted by O'Leary J. in Regina v. Consumers Glass, 33 O.R. 2d 228 at 248 (1981).
62 See Areeda and Turner, supra note 59. See Regina v. Consumers Glass Co., 33 O.R. 2d 228
at 249 - 250 (1981) where this part of the Areeda and Turner article is quoted.
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the effect or tendency to lessen competition substantially or eliminate a
competitor.63 There is no significant judicial authority that outlines
what would constitute an actual effect or tendency to lessen competition
substantially or eliminate a competitor. In Hoffmann-La Roche, how-
ever, it was noted that causing a competitor to withdraw from the market
when it had only a very small share of the market was probably not a
substantial lessening of competition and since the competitor still made
some sales, competition was not eliminated."4 As to a design or intent to
have an effect or tendency to lessen competition substantially, a motive of
self-preservation 65 or an attempt to minimize losses66 does not constitute
such an intent. It may be difficult to show what is sufficient to amount to
a substantial lessening of competition; it may in fact be easier to succeed
in cases where there is an elimination of competition even though the
initial amount of competition was not substantial.
The court will look to evidence of intent such as the internal docu-
ments of the accused.67 Section 34(1) is a criminal law provision and so
it is necessary to show an intent to lessen competition substantially be-
yond a reasonable doubt.6" If there are no other indicia of intent other
than unreasonably low prices and if there is no actual effect or tendency
to lessen competition, then the intent can only be inferred if there is no
other explanation for the low prices.69
Section 34(1) provides, as a penalty, for a maximum of two years of
imprisonment. A fine would most likely be substituted for imprisonment
where the fine may be unlimited and within the discretion of the court.70
Upon obtaining a conviction, a prohibition order may be issued in addi-
tion to any other penalty.7" Where criminal proceedings have been com-
menced, but prior to a conviction, the court may issue a prohibition
order where it appears that a person has done, is about to do, or is likely
to do any act or thing that would constitute a section 34(1) offense.72
Furthermore, any person who has suffered a loss as a consequence of
predatory or geographic price discrimination may sue for damages.73
There are very few reported cases on section 34(1)(c). Regina v.
Hoffmann-La Roche resulted in a conviction under section 34(l)(c) and
is the only conviction that has been obtained on section 34(1)(c). 74 It
seems reasonable to conclude that the difficulties involved in showing
63 See Regina v. Hoffmann-La Roche, 28 O.R. 2d 164 at 205 (1980).
64 Id. at 205 - 206.
65 Regina v. Ray, Police Court, South Burnaby, B.C., Dec. 11, 1957 (unreported decision).
66 Regina v. Consumers Glass, 33 O.R. 2d 338 at 252, 255 (1981).
67 Regina v. Hoffmann-La Roche, 28 O.R. 2d 164 at 206-213 (1980).
68 Regina v. Fairmont Plating (Alta.) Ltd., Alta. S.C., 1977 (unreported decision).
69 Id.
70 Criminal Code, R.S.C. ch. C-34, s. 646(1) (1970).
71 Combines Investigation Act, R.S.C. ch. C-23, as amended, s. 30(1) (1970).
72 Id. at s. 30 (2).
73 Id. at s. 31.1.
74 See generally FLAUELL supra, note 6.
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unreasonably low prices and the need to show a design or actual effect or
tendency to eliminate competition or substantially lessen competition
(with doubt as to what would constitute substantially) make section
34(l)(c) a difficult provision to enforce.75
2. U.S. Law on Predatory Pricing
In the United States, predatory pricing on the part of a dominant
firm can be challenged as monopolization under section 2 of the Sherman
Act.76 Such pricing by non-dominant firms can, under some circum-
stances, be challenged as an attempt to monopolize section 2, or, if done
in concert with others, as a combination in restraint of trade under sec-
tion 1 of the Sherman Act.
The elements of the monopolization offense as it applies to preda-
tory pricing are: first, the possession of monopoly power and second, the
use of predatory pricing to acquire or maintain such power.77
A company has monopoly power if it has "the power to control
market prices or exclude competition."78 The existence of that power
can be shown by direct evidence of the exercise of control over price or
competition; by evidence of a dominant market share in a properly de-
fined product and geographic market;79 or by other evidence of market
power which would include regulatory and nonregulatory barriers to en-
try, the extraction of higher than normal profits over an extended period
of time, or significant economies of scale and other cost advantages.
Generally, none of these factors are by themselves conclusive; rather,
75 Refer to the introduction where it is noted that there is some doubt as to the existence of
predatory pricing.
76 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1982).
77 See, e.g., United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 160, 182 (1911); Standard
Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 43 (1911); Southern Pacific Communications Co. v. American
Telephone & Telegraph Co., 740 F.2d 980, 1000, 1002 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1359
(1985); Janich Bros. v. American Distilling Co., 570 F. 2d 848, 855 (9th Cir. 1977), cert denied, 439
U.S. 829 (1978).
78 United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 291 (1956).
79 In the famous Alcoa case (United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 424
(2d Cir. 1945)), Judge Learned Hand stated that a market share of 90% "is enough to constitute a
monopoly; it is doubtful whether sixty or sixty-four percent would be enough; and certainly thirty-
three percent is not." Subsequent cases, while varying somewhat in the precise numbers, have gener-
ally adhered to thes parameters. See, eg., United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71
(1966); Weiss v. York Hospital, 745 F.2d 786, 827 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1777 (1985)
(market share in excess of 80% sufficient); Dimmitt Agri Industries, Inc. v. CPC International, Inc.,
679 F.2d 516 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1082 (1983) (25% insufficient).
The courts disagree over how strong an inference of lack of market power can be drawn from
low market shares (e.g. less than 50%). Compare Cliff Food Stores, Inc. v. Kroger, Inc., 417 F.2d
203, 207 n.2 (5th Cir. 1969) ("something more than 50% of the market is a prerequisite to finding a
monopoly") with Hayden Publishing Co., Inc. v. Cox Broadcasting Corp., 730 F.2d 64, 69 n.7 (2d
Cir. 1984) ("a party may have monopoly power in a particular market, even though its market share
is less than 50%").
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they are weighed together to form a judgment as to whether the firm in
question can control prices or exclude competitors.
Once it is established that a firm possesses monopoly power, the
next issue is whether the firm has engaged in predatory pricing. That is,
pricing that tends "to eliminate rivals and create a market structure en-
abling the seller to recoup his losses."80 There appears to be general
agreement that prices below marginal cost, or average variable cost as its
surrogate where marginal cost is difficult to determine, are presumptively
predatory.81
There is less agreement on whether prices above marginal cost can
ever be predatory. U.S. courts have regarded this as a difficult issue in
light of the procompetitive policy of the antitrust laws. The Second Cir-
cuit held that: "[p]redatory pricing is difficult to distinguish from vigor-
ous price competition. Inadvertently condemning such competition as
an instance of predation will undoubtedly chill the very behavior the an-
titrust laws seek to promote. 82
In order to avoid such a chilling effect, some courts have adopted an
irrebuttable presumption that a price that exceeds both incremental and
average total cost does not constitute predatory pricing. 3 Other courts,
while accepting a general presumption that a price above marginal cost is
nonpredatory, allow such a price to be challenged if the plaintiff can
show by clear and convincing evidence that the price was predatory in
the sense of being aimed at eliminating or disciplining competition in
order to achieve higher future profits.8 4 The Supreme Court has recently
stated, in dictum, that predatory pricing in a section 2 case "means pric-
ing below some appropriate measure of cost."8" It remains to be seen
what influence this dictum will have on the issue that now divides the
lower courts.
The elements of an attempt to monopolize, in most U.S. courts, are:
conduct arising out of a specific intent86 to acquire a monopoly in the
relevant market, and a dangerous probability that the attempt would be
successful. The Ninth Circuit,87 however, dispenses with the latter re-
80 William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Continental Baking Co. 668 F.2d 1014, 1035 (9th
Cir. 1981), cert. denied 459 U.S. 825 (1982).
81 See, eg., Inglis, 668 F.2d at 1036; Northeastern Telephone Co. v. American Telephone &
Telegraph Co., 651 F.2d 76, 88 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 943 (1982).
82 Northeastern Telephone Co. v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 651 F.2d at 88.
83 Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227 (Ist Cir. 1983); Arthur S.
Langenderfer, Inc. v. S.E. Johnson Co., 729 F.2d 1050 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 510 (1984).
84 See Transamerica Computer Co. v. IBM Corp., 698 F.2d 1377, 1388 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
464 U.S. 955 (1983); William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Continental Baking Co. 668 F.2d
1014, 1035 (9th Cir. 1981), cert denied, 459 U.S. 825 (1982).
85 Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. 106 S. Ct. 1348, 1355 n.8 (1986).
86 'Specific Intent', generally, requires an intent in fact to do the impuned act beyond just a
presumed intention from the logical consequences of one's acts.
87 The Ninth Circuit is composed of the states of California, Oregon and Washington.
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quirement in some instances."8
The issues in an attempt to monopolize case that involve predatory
pricing are similar to those in a monopolization case. Although a de-
fendant does not need to be a monopolist to be guilty of an attempt to
monopolize, it is still necessary-in those jurisdictions in which a danger-
ous probability of success must be proven-to show the factors that
make it plausible that the defendant could become a monopolist. These
factors usually involve a showing of a substantial market share on the
part of the defendant.8 9 Moreover, the issue of whether pricing is preda-
tory is essentially identical to that in a monopolization case.90 A plaintiff
must, however, demonstrate that the "defendant had a specific intent to
destroy competition or build monopoly,"91 not simply the mere intent to
do the act, as would be sufficient where the defendant is a monopolist.
An agreement among some competitors to price at predatory levels,
so as to discipline or eliminate another competitor, can be a per se viola-
tion of section 1 of the Sherman Act.9 2 However, in those cases where
the agreement cannot be proved directly, but must be inferred from cir-
cumstantial evidence, the Supreme Court has held that the inherent im-
plausibility of such an agreement must be taken into account. Beginning
with the premise that predatory pricing schemes, even by a single firm,
are rarely tried, and even more rarely successful, the Court reasoned that
a collective predatory scheme "is incalculably more difficult to execute
than an analogous plan undertaken by a single predator. The conspira-
tors must allocate the losses to be sustained during the conspiracy's oper-
ation, and must also allocate any gains to be realized from its success."9 3
In view of the unlikelihood of success, the Court concluded that
defendants had no plausible motive to conspire, and in the absence of
such a motive, unambiguous evidence was necessary to permit a jury to
find that such a conspiracy had indeed taken place.94
3. Comparison of Canadian and U.S. Laws on Predatory Pricing
The Canadian and U.S. laws on predatory pricing are very similar
and have only a few possible and minor differences. The differences are
insignificant given that both the U.S. and Canadian laws on predatory
88 See, eg., Lessig v. Tidewater Oil Co., 307 F.2d 459, 474-75 (9th Cir.), cerL denied, 377 U.S.
993 (1964).
89 See, e.g., United States v. Emoire Gas Corp., 537 F.2d 296, 305 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 1122 (1977) (50% share not sufficient to show dangerous probability).
90 See, eg., William Inglis & Sons Baking 668 F.2d at 1031-39.
91 Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 626 (1953).
92 In re Japanese Electronic Products Antitrust Litigation, 723 F.2d 238, 306 (3d Cir. 1983),
rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 106 S. s
Ct. 1348 (1986).
93 Matsushita Electric Industrial, 106 S. Ct. at 1358 (1986).
94 Id. at 1362.
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pricing are difficult to enforce and have not been enforced very success-
fully in recent years.
It may be that it is easier to establish the U.S. standard of a danger-
ous probability of success at attempting to monopolize than it is to estab-
lish the Canadian standard of an actual or designed effect, or tendency of
lessening competition substantially or eliminating a competitor.
Although it is not yet clear, it appears that the Canadian cost test
may be slightly different than in the United States. Although the average
variable cost appears to be the standard in both the United States and
Canada, U.S. courts generally have a per se violation rule for below aver-
age variable cost pricing while Canadian courts may consider other fac-
tors in conjunction with prices below average variable costs. The U.S.
courts generally presume that prices above average total costs are not
predatory while prices between average variable costs and average total
costs should be considered in light of other factors. The Canadian law
appears to be that prices above average variable costs are presumed to be
nonpredatory. Overall, the above-noted differences in the Canadian and
U.S. laws are not really significant in light of the lack of enforcement of
these laws.
II. IMPORT RELIEF LAWS
A. Dumping
1. Summary of Canadian Law on Dumping
Canadian anti-dumping law is set out in the Special Import Meas-
ures Act,95 and generally follows the Anti-dumping Code under
GATT.96 Under the Special Import Measures Act, anti-dumping duties
are imposed where:
dumping is taking.place, that is, the "normal value" (or price in the
home market) for the goods exceeds the "export price" (or the price at
which the goods are sold to the Canadian buyer); and the dumping has
caused, is causing or is likely to cause material injury to Canadian pro-
duction or has caused or is causing material retardation to the estab-
lishment of the production of like goods in Canada. 97
The Deputy Minister of National Revenue is responsible for the de-
termination of the existence and extent of dumping9" while the Canadian
Import Tribunal is responsible for determining whether there is material
injury.99 The procedure for the assessment of an anti-dumping duty be-
95 S.C. ch. 25 (1984), as amended S.C. ch. 1 (1986).
96 Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Geneva, 1979.
97 Special Import Measures Act, S.C. ch. 25, s. 3 (1984).
98 Id. at ss. 38-41.
99 Id. at ss. 42-43. (The "Canadian Import Tribunal" is established under s. 63 - s. 77 of the
Special Import Measures Act).
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gins by an investigation by the Deputy Minister. The investigation is
initiated by:
(1) the Deputy Minister on his own initiative;
(2) within 30 days of receiving a properly documented complaint;
(3) on receiving a direction from the Canadian Import Tribunal with
respect to goods similar to those already under investigation; or
(4) on advice from the Canadian Import Tribunal that there are rea-
sonable grounds to believe that dumped goods which the Deputy Min-
ister has decided not to investigate are causing material injury. O
On receipt of a properly documented complaint, the Deputy Minister has
thirty days to determine whether to initiate an investigation on the basis
of whether there is evidence of dumping and evidence of past, present or
future material injury.' The question of the existence of past, present
or future material injury can be referred to the Tribunal within thirty
days of a decision not to investigate or to terminate an investigation due
to lack of evidence of material injury.' °2 The Tribunal renders its deci-
sion on such a reference without a hearing, on the basis of the informa-
tion before the Deputy Minister, and within thirty days.'0 3
When an investigation is started, notice is given to exporters and
importers of the goods in question, to the complainant, and to others as
prescribed.'I4 The investigation generally begins with questionnaires be-
ing sent to importers and exporters of the goods.
The Deputy Minister has ninety days to make his preliminary deter-
mination: 105 135 days in exceptionally difficult or complex cases.106 The
Deputy Minister has a further ninety days to make a final determination
based on any further evidence received. For each determination, the
Deputy Minister must specify the goods and the margin of dumping (i.e.,
the difference between the normal value of the goods and the export
price).' 017 The payment, or the posting of security for payment, by the
importer of a provisional duty on the imported goods begins on the day
of the preliminary determination.'08
After the preliminary determination by the Deputy Minister, the
Canadian Import Tribunal begins its inquiry into material injury.109 The
Tribunal's decision must be made within 120 days of notice of the Dep-
uty Minister's preliminary determination.'10 The Canadian Import Tri-
100 Id. at s. 31.
101 Id. at s. 31(1).
102 Id. at ss. 33(2)(b), 34(b), 35(2)(b).
103 Id. at s. 37.
104 Id. at s. 34(1)(a).
105 Id. at s. 38(1).
106 Id. at s. 39(1).
107 Id. at s. 38(1)(a).
108 Id. at s. 8.
109 Id at s. 42.
110 Id. at s. 43(1).
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bunal will hold hearings at which all interested persons, as specified in
the Regulations,' may make representations and present evidence in-
cluding the calling of witnesses. A person interested in the public inter-
est can make representations, and the Tribunal may, on considering such
representations, recommend to the Minister of Finance that the full
amount of the duties not be imposed. 1
12
A finding of injury specifies the goods and, where applicable, the
supplier and the country of origin.1 3 Exporters of the goods from that
country, unless excluded from the injury finding, as well as new entrants
to the industry supplying those goods in that country, will be subject to
the finding of the Tribunal. 114 The importer is responsible for payment
of the anti-dumping duties and "any person interested in the importation
of the goods" can request, through the Deputy Minister, to have the Ca-
nadian Import Tribunal determine" 5 who "is in reality the importer of
the goods.""' 6
Undertakings can be made to revise prices to eliminate the margin
of dumping.117 The undertakings can be made only if made prior to the
preliminary determination of the Deputy Minister;". if the importers or
exporters account for substantially all the exports to Canada of the goods
in question, 9 and if the Deputy Minister is satisfied that the undertak-
ing will not cause prices to importers to increase by more than the mar-
gin of dumping and would not be impracticable to administer. 120 The
investigation can be reopened where the undertaking is violated; new in-
formation comes before the Deputy Minister and the Deputy Minister
reopens the investigation; or where the complainant, exporters or import-
ers move to have the investigation reopened.' 2 '
Undertakings between the government and a number of importers
or exporters may permit the government to effectively form a cartel in an
industry with respect to the goods that are the subject of the dumping
action.
A final determination of dumping can be appealed by obtaining a
redetermination by an officer designated under the Customs Act 122 and
by a request to the Deputy Minister for a redetermination. 23 The Dep-
111 S.O.R./84-927, CAN. GAZ., Part II, vol. 118, No. 25, p. 4286, s. 41.
112 Special Import Measures Act, S.C. (1984), ch.25, s. 45.
113 Id. at s. 43.
114 Id. at s. 42.
115 Id. at s. 89 and see ss. 90-95 for the rules and procedures governing the determination of the
true importer by the Tribunal.
116 Id. at s. 2(1), definition of "importer."
117 Id. at ss. 49-54.
118 Id. at s. 49(2)(b).
119 Id at s. 2(1) definition of "undertaking."
120 Id. at s. 49(2)(a), (c).
121 Id. at s. 51 and s. 52.
122 Id. at s. 57.
123 Id. at s. 59.
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uty Minister's redetermination can be appealed to the Tariff Board 12 4
and from there to the Federal Court of Canada on a question of law. 125
The Canadian Import Tribunal's decisions on injury can be appealed on
matters other than questions of fact to the Federal Court of Canada. 126
The margin of dumping is the difference between the normal value
of the goods and the export price.127 Generally, normal value is deter-
mined by considering sales of like goods to nonassociated purchasers at
the same trade level as the importer, in the same quantities, under ordi-
nary commercial and competitive conditions, during a sixty day period
(or a longer period as is necessary) selected by the Deputy Minister, and
in the place from which the goods were shipped directly to Canada. 128
Where these conditions are not met, other bases for determination can be
used. 129 Certain adjustments are made such as for taxation and differ-
ences in terms of sale.
130
The export price is determined according to the lesser of the ex-
porter's adjusted sale price or the importer's adjusted purchase price.
The adjustments are the deduction of costs to prepare goods for shipment
to Canada over and above those costs on sales of like goods in the coun-
try of export; duties or taxes imposed by a law of Canada or of a prov-
ince; and all other costs or charges resulting from the exportation of the
goods.131 Special rules for the calculation of the export price provide for
exceptional circumstances. 132
The factors considered in assessing material injury to Canadian pro-
duction of like goods to those being dumped includes such things as loss
of domestic production and sales, loss of market share, loss of employ-
ment, loss of profit, lowering of return on investment, and decrease in
capacity utilization. 133 The material injury must occur as a consequence
of the dumping. A showing of consumer preference, 134 strikes, 3 5 infer-
ior quality, 136 inefficient marketing, 137 or some similar reason for the in-
jury to domestic production can avert a finding of material injury. The
124 Id. at s. 61.
125 Id. at s. 62.
126 Federal Court Act, R.S.C. 2nd supp, ch. 10, s. 28.
127 Special Import Measures Act, S.C. 1984, ch.25, s. 2(l) definitions of "margin of dumping,"
"normal value" and "export price."
128 Id. at s. 15.
129 Id. at ss. 16-23.
130 S.O.R./84-927, s.5.
131 Special Import Measures Act, S.C. 1984, ch.25, s.24.
132 Id. at ss. 25-28.
133 Von Kalinowski, World Law of Competition, Unit A, Vol. A3, Canada, by Gordon Kaiser,
1985, pp. 13-42 to 13-43.
134 For instance in Bronze or Brass Values, 1 C.E.R. 118, (1979) it was found that the exporter
offered a product which met distinctive market requirements.
135 In Asbestos Cement Pressure Pipe,, 1 C.E.R. 42, (1979) it was found that the material
injury was due to declining demand and strikes.
136 In Steel Sheet Piling, ADT 10-80, Dec. 10, 1980, it was found that the material injury was
due to technical imperfections in the product.
Vol. 12:39 1987
22
Canada-United States Law Journal, Vol. 12 [1987], Iss. , Art. 9
https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/cuslj/vol12/iss/9
OVERLAP BETWEEN ANTITRUST AND IMPORT RELIEF
Tribunal can consider the Deputy Minister's determination of the margin
of dumping in assessing material injury.138
In summary, an anti-dumping duty is imposed where there is dump-
ing (as determined by the Deputy Minister) which has caused, will cause
or is causing material injury to the production of like goods in Canada or
has caused or is causing a material retardation of the establishment of the
production of like goods in Canada (as determined by the Canadian Im-
port Tribunal).
2. Summary of U.S. Law on Dumping
The Anti-dumping Act of 1912 provides a remedy against below
home market pricing of imports. Under the Anti-dumping Act, 19
U.S.C. §§ 1671-1677 (Supp. 1984), if a foreign manufacturer is selling
goods in the United States at less than fair value and these sales cause or
threaten material injury to a U.S. industry or materially retard its estab-
lishment, then a duty in an amount equal to the amount by which the
foreign market value exceeds the U.S. price shall be imposed upon the
imports from the foreign country in question as the anti-dumping duty.
This duty is an additional duty that is assessed on top of all regular duties
imposed by law.
Consideration of the two primary issues under the anti-dumping law
is undertaken by two agencies, the International Trade Commission
(ITC) and the Department of Commerce.
The determination of the existence of sales at less than fair value
(LTFV) can be initiated by the Department of Commerce or pursuant to
a petition by an interested party. 139 Upon the filing of a petition, the
Department of Commerce has twenty days to determine whether there is
sufficient evidence of dumping to warrant an investigation."4
A preliminary determination on injury is made by the ITC within
forty-five days from the date a petition is filed or the date it receives
notice that the Department of Commerce has commenced an investiga-
tion without a petition.14' A preliminary determination of the sales at
LTFV is made by the Department of Commerce within 160 days of the
filing of a petition or the commencement of an investigation without a
petition, or within ninety days of such time if the petitioner and the inter-
ested parties verify the information available after sixty days and submit
to a preliminary determination on that basis.142 In complex cases the
preliminary determination of the Department of Commerce can be ex-
137 In Ceramic Tiles, 2 C.E.R. 134 (1980), it was found that the material injury was due to the
failure of the complainant to respond to needs of the Canadian market.
138 Remington Arms of Canada Ltd. v. Les Industries Valcatier, [1982] 1 F.C. 586 (C.A.).
139 19 U.S.C. § 1673a. "Interested party" is defined in 19 U.S.C. § 1677.
140 19 U.S.C. § 1673a(c).
141 19 U.S.C. § 1673b(a).
142 19 U.S.C. § 1673(b).
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tended to 210 days.143
A final determination is generally made by the Department of Com-
merce within seventy-five days of its preliminary determination. 144 The
ITC, where it has made an affirmative preliminary determination (i.e., a
preliminary finding of material injury), makes its final determination on
injury before the later of 120 days from an affirmative preliminary deter-
mination by it or forty-five days from a final determination of the Depart-
ment of Commerce. 145 Where the ITC has made a negative preliminary
determination it has up to seventy-five days after reversing this negative
finding to render its final determination.
146
Once a preliminary determination of sales at LTFV is made, a cash
deposit, bond or other security as deemed appropriate must be posted
with respect to imports of merchandise subject to the order.147 The se-
curity is equal to the estimated average amount by which the foreign
market value exceeds the U.S. price.1 48 Upon an affirmative final deter-
mination by the ITC, anti-dumping duties must be assessed in the
amount that the foreign market value exceeds the U.S. price within six
months of there being satisfactory information to assess the amount, and
in any case no later than twelve months after the end of the annual ac-
counting period of the manufacturer in which the merchandise was sold
or consumed.49 In the interim, a deposit of the estimated anti-dumping
duties is required pending liquidation of entries of merchandise. 150
Investigations can be terminated by agreements (i.e., undertakings)
by exporters to cease exports or to revise prices so as to eliminate the
difference between foreign market value and the U.S. price. Investiga-
tions can also be terminated by certain circumstances where the injurious
effect of the exports can be completely eliminated with a revision of
prices. 51 The investigation can be continued on request by an interested
party or by an exporter or exporters who account for a significant pro-
portion of exports of the merchandise to the United States. 52 The inves-
tigation may also be resumed where the agreement is violated.
1 53
The anti-dumping law specifies the criteria for determining the exist-
ence of sales at LTFV.154 To determine if the sales are at LTFV, the
foreign market value is compared to the U.S. price.
Foreign market price is calculated on the basis of the wholesale
143 19 U.S.C. § 1673(c).
144 19 U.S.C. § 1673d(a).
145 19 U.S.C. § 1673d(b)(2).
146 19 U.S.C. § 1673d(b)(3).
147 19 U.S.C. § 1673b(d).
148 19 U.S.C. § 1673b(d).
149 19 U.S.C. § 1673e(a)(1).
150 19 U.S.C. § 1673(a)(3).
151 19 U.S.C. § 1673c.
152 19 U.S.C. § 1673c(g).
153 19 U.S.C. § 1673c(i).
154 19 U.S.C. § 167Tb, 19 C.F.R. § 353.3.
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price, after certain adjustments, for sales in ordinary commerce in the
home market. If the merchandise is not sold in the home market or if the
determination of the home market price is not practical, then there are
alternative methods of calculating the foreign market value. 155 The U.S.
price is defined as the purchase price, or the exporter's sales price, again,
with appropriate adjustments. 156
The ITC determines whether the dumping is likely to cause material
injury, or threat thereof, to an industry in the United States or materially
retard the establishment of an industry thereof. Policies and procedures
for the ITC on this matter are set out in the ITC Regulations. In making
this determination, the ITC is required to (1) define an industry, and
(2) determine if that industry has been materially injured. The law de-
fines industry to mean "the domestic producers as a whole of a like prod-
uct, or those producers whose collective output of the like product
constitutes a major proportion of the total domestic production of that
product." '157 The law also authorizes the ITC, in appropriate circum-
stances, to divide the United States into two or more product markets
and treat the producers within each market as separate industries if:
"(i) the producers within such markets sell all or almost all their produc-
tion of the like product in question in that market, and (ii) the demand in
that market is not supplied to any substantial degree by producers of the
product in question located elsewhere in the United States."'158
In determining whether material injury exists, the factors to be con-
sidered include the volume of imports, the effect of imports on prices,
and the impact of imports on domestic producers of like products.159
The law spells out how the ITC will evaluate these factors.
With respect to the volume of imports, section 771(7) states that
"the Commission shall consider whether the volume of imports of the
merchandise, or any increase in that volume, either in absolute terms or
relative to production or consumption in the United States, is signifi-
cant." An import penetration of .2% was found to be clearly insignifi-
cant, 1" while a maximum volume of imports of 4.5% was accepted as
significant.161
As to price, section 771(7) directs the ITC to consider whether there
has been significant price undercutting by the imported merchandise, and
whether the effect of imports otherwise depresses the price to a signifi-
155 19 C.F.R. § 353.3.
156 19 C.F.R. § 353.10.
157 19 U.S.C. § 1677.
158 Id.
159 19 C.F.R. §§ 207.26 and 207.27.
160 Secondary Aluminum Alloy in Unwrought Form from the United Kingdom, 731-TA-40
(Preliminary), May 1981, 2 I.T.R.D. 5515.
161 Atlantic Sugar, Ltd. v. United States, 2 Ct. Int'l Trade 174, 2 I.T.R.D. 1630, 519 F. Supp
916 (1981).
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cant degree or prevents price increases which otherwise would have oc-
curred to a significant degree.
As to the impact of imports on the domestic industry, the section
directs the ITC to:
evaluate all relevant economic factors which have a bearing on the
state of the industry, including, but not limited to: actual and potential
decline in output, sales, market share, profits, productivity, return on
investments and utilization of capacity, factors affecting domestic
prices, and actual and potential negative affects on cash flow, inven-
tories, employment, wages, growth, availability to raise capital, and
investments. 162
In determining whether there is a likelihood of threat of material
injury, an examination of trends will be important. For example, "the
rate of increase of subsidized or dumped exports to the U.S. market; ca-
pacity in the exporting country to generate exports; and, the availability
of other export markets." 163 Under section 771(7)(f), the ITC is directed
to consider eight economic factors, including, among others: increased
capacity in the exporting country, rapid increase in U.S. market penetra-
tion, and the probability that imports will enter the United States at
prices which will suppress or depress U.S. prices.
Under the statute, the causal relationship between the dumped im-
ports and the existence of material injury is stated as "by reason of." A
petitioner for anti-dumping duties must demonstrate that there is a
causal link between the dumping and material injury. However, no par-
ticular standard has been imposed,"6 and the standard applied is not as
stringent as the proximate cause of injury standard in U.S. antitrust and
tort laws.
The Anti-dumping Act of 1916, made it unlawful "commonly and
systematically" to import goods into the U.S. market "at a price substan-
tially less than the actual market value or wholesale price" of such goods
in their home market with an intent to injure or destroy an industry in
the United States. These types of sales have become known as "preda-
tory dumping." The 1916 Act has been an ineffective remedy from the
point of view of U.S. industry. No plaintiff has ever recovered in a pri-
vate treble damage action. The requirement that plaintiffs prove the de-
fendant was dumping his goods with a predatory intent has essentially
barred recovery. 165 At the time of its enactment, Congress recognized
the potential problem the intent requirement would create in private
treble damage actions; nevertheless, it felt the requirement was necessary
because of the provision that made predatory dumping a criminal of-
162 19 U.S.C. § 1677.
163 19 C.F.R. § 207.26(d).
164 Outboard Marine Corp. v. Pezetzel, 461 F.Supp. 384 (D. Del. 1978).
165 53 CONG. REC. 10,751 (1916) (remarks of Rep. Helvering).
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fense 66 Not surprisingly, this practical inability to recover damages
under the statute has led to various proposals over the years to amend
the 1916 Act.
A recent proposal by Senator Specter (R.-Pa.), would amend the
1916 Act to provide a far more accessible remedy for U.S. industry. 167 It
may also create a separate track for recovery under the U.S. antitrust
laws by amending the Clayton Act to include the Anti-dumping Act of
1916 within the definition of the antitrust laws. Finally, the bill would
provide a private right of action against customs fraud.
Dumping has its counterpart in price discrimination and predatory
pricing. Because the Anti-dumping Act has an intent requirement for
predatory dumping, it does not impose a harsher requirement that
would be required for a domestic predatory pricing action. However, an
anti-dumping action under § 1671 does not allow defenses which are
available under a domestic price discrimination claim. The anti-dumping
laws lack a meeting competition defense, nor is there a changing condi-
tions defense. Both of these defenses are designed to avoid punishing
rational economic behavior. Nevertheless, because adjustments to price
are permitted, a de facto cost justification defense is permitted.
B. Countervailing
1. Summary of Canadian Law on Countervailing
As is the case for anti-dumping law in Canada, the imposition of
countervailing duties is governed by the Special Import Measures Act.
1 68
Countervailing duties can be imposed by the Governor in Council on
certain conditions and on the advice of the Minister of Finance,1 69 or
they can be imposed upon a determination by the Deputy Minister of
National Revenue of an amount of the subsidy and upon a finding by the
Canadian Import Tribunal that the subsidization caused, is causing or is
likely to cause material injury to the production of like goods in Canada,
or has caused or is causing material retardation to the establishment of
the production of like goods in Canada.
The Governor in Council may order an investigation to determine
the amount of the subsidy on subsidized goods. Upon a determination by
the Deputy Minister of the amount and upon the authorization of Can-
ada by the Committee of Signatories' established pursuant to Article 16
of the GATT Subsidies and Countervailing Duties Agreement 170 to im-
pose countervailing duties on such subsidized goods, the Governor in
166 See Remington Arms of Canada Ltd. v. Les Industries Valcartiey, Federal Court of Ap-
peal, June 8, 1981.
167 S. 1655, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985).
168 S.C. 1984, ch.25, as amended S.C. 1986, ch.1.
169 Id. at s. 7.
170 Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI, XXIII of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, signed at Geneva, Dec. 17, 1979.
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Council may on the recommendation of the Minister of Finance make an
order imposing a countervailing duty.17" ' The order applies to subsidized
goods that are the product of the country specified in the order and that
are of the same description as the goods in respect to which the Deputy
Minister has made his determination. The amount of the duty is limited
to the amount of the subsidy in cases where the duty imposed would
otherwise exceed the subsidy.' 72
The Deputy Minister of National Revenue is responsible for deter-
mining the amount of a subsidy.173 The investigation by the Deputy
Minister into the amount of subsidy is initiated by the Deputy Minister:
(1) on his own initiative;
(2) within 30 days of receiving a properly documented complaint;
(3) on receiving a direction from the Canadian Import Tribunal with
respect to goods similar to those already under investigation; or
(4) on advice from the Canadian Import Tribunal that there are rea-
sonable grounds to believe that subsidized goods which the Deputy
Minister has decided not to investigate are causing material injury. 174
On receipt of a properly documented complaint, the Deputy Minister has
thirty days to determine whether to initiate an investigation on the basis
of whether there is evidence of subsidization of the goods and whether
there is evidence of past, present or future material injury.' 75
Notice of the investigation is given to exporters and importers of the
goods in question, to the complainant and to others as are prescribed. 176
The Deputy Minister has ninety days to render a preliminary determina-
tion 177 or 135 days in exceptionally difficult or complex cases.1 78 The
Deputy Minister has a further ninety days to make a final determina-
tion.' 79 For each determination, the Deputy Minister must specify the
goods, the amount of subsidy, the amount of the subsidy that is an export
subsidy, and the name of the importer of the goods.'8 0
The Canadian Import Tribunal begins its inquiry into material in-
jury upon receipt of notice of a preliminary determination.' 8 ' The Tribu-
nal's decision must be made within 120 days.' 82 Hearings are held at
which all interested persons, as specified in the Regulations, 8 3 as well as
171 Special Import Measures Act, S.C. 1984, ch. 25, s. 7(1).
172 Id. at s. 7(2).
173 Id. at ss. 38-41.
174 Id. at s. 31.
175 Id. at s. 31(1).
176 Id. at s. 34(l)(a).
177 Id. at s. 38(1).
178 Id. at s. 39(1).
179 Id. at s. 41.
180 Id. at s. 38(1)(a).
181 Id. at s. 42.
182 Id. at s. 43.
183 S.O.R./84-927, s. 41.
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persons interested with respect to the public interest,"8 4 may make repre-
sentations. The Tribunal can recommend to the Minister of Finance that
the full amount of the duty not be imposed where it would not be in the
public interest to do so.1" 5
A finding of material injury specifies the goods and, where applica-
ble, the supplier and country of origin. The importer is responsible for
payment of the countervailing duty." 6 Any person interested in the im-
portation of the goods can request, through the Deputy Minister, to have
the Canadian Import Tribunal determine who "is in reality the importer
of the goods." 
18 7
The countervailing duty can be avoided by making an undertaking
to revise prices to eliminate the effect of the subsidy and the material
injury or retardation resulting from the subsidy.' The undertakings
can be made only prior to the preliminary determination of the Deputy
Minister;189 if the importer or exporters account for substantially all the
exports to Canada of the goods in question;' 90 and if the Deputy Minister
is satisfied that the undertaking will not cause prices to importers to in-
crease by more than the estimated amount of the subsidy and would not
be impracticable to administer. 91 The investigation can be reopened
where the undertaking is violated; new information comes before the
Deputy Minister and the Deputy Minister reopens the investigation; or
where the complainant, exporters or importers move to have the investi-
gation reopened.'
92
A final determination of the amount of a subsidy can be appealed by
obtaining a redetermination by an officer who is designated under the
Customs Act 93 and by a request to the Deputy Minister for a redetermi-
nation. 194 The Deputy Minister's redetermination can be appealed to the
Tariff Board'95 and from there, to the Federal Court of Canada on a
question of law. 96 The Canadian Import Tribunal's decisions on injury
can be appealed on matters other than questions of fact to the Federal
Court of Canada. 197
The meaning of "subsidy" is not limited by any precise definition in
184 Special Import Measures Act, S.C. 1984, ch. 25, s. 45.
185 Id. at s. 45(1).
186 Id. at s. 8 and s. 11.
187 Id. at s. 89.
188 Id. at s. 49.
189 Id. at s. 49(2)(b).
190 Id. at s. 2(1) (definition of "undertaking").
191 Id. at s. 49(2)(a), (c).
192 Id. at s. 51 and s. 52.
193 Id. at s. 57.
194 Id. at s. 59.
195 Id. at s. 61.
196 Id. at s. 62.
197 Federal Court Act, R.S.C. ch. 10, s. 28 (1970).
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the Special Import Measures Act, but, what is included in the term sub-
sidy is set out as follows:
Subsidy includes any financial or other commercial benefit that has
accrued or will accrue, directly or indirectly, to persons engaged in the
production, manufacture, growth, processing, purchase, distribution,
transportation, sale, export or import of goods, as a result of any
scheme, program, practice or thing done, provided or implemented by
the government of a country other than Canada, but does not include
the amount of any duty or internal tax imposed on goods by the gov-
ernment of the country of origin or country of export from which the
goods, because of their exportation from the country of export or
country of origin, have been exempted or have been or will, be relieved
by means of refund or drawback.1
98
The amount of the subsidy generally means the amount determined and
adjusted in the manner provided for in the regulations. 99 The regula-
tions provide rules for calculating the subsidy on the goods in circum-
stances where the subsidy is in the form of a grant, a loan at a
preferential rate, income tax credits, refunds or exemptions, deferral of
income tax, a refund of indirect taxes upon the export of goods, or goods
or services are provided by a government on terms more favorable than
for goods destined for domestic consumption. 2" Provision is made for
the deduction of expenses or charges incurred in obtaining the subsidy.20'
Where the manner of determining the amount of the subsidy has not
been prescribed or where sufficient information has not been furnished or
is not available to determine the amount of the subsidy in the prescribed
manner, then the amount of the subsidy on the goods is to be determined
and adjusted in the manner specified by the Minister of National
Revenue.202
There have been no cases on the question of material injury in a
situation that involved a countervailing duty, however, it is reasonable to
expect that the same factors in a dumping case will be considered in a
countervailing duty case. A summary of the factors considered in a
dumping case are noted above in the section on the Canadian law on
dumping.
In summary, a countervailing duty can be imposed where there is a
subsidy (as determined by the Deputy Minister of National Revenue)
which has caused, is causing or will cause material injury to the produc-
tion of like goods in Canada or has caused or is causing material retarda-
tion to the establishment of the production of like goods in Canada (as
198 Special Import Measures Act, S.C. 1984, ch. 25 s. 2(1).
199 The definition of "amount of the subsidy" and the manner provided in the Regulations is
set out in S.O.R./84-927, ss. 26-36.
200 S.O.R./84-927, ss. 26-36.
201 S.O.R./84-927, s. 26.
202 Special Import Measures Act, S.C. 1984, ch. 25, s. 2(1) (definition of "amount of the
subsidy").
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determined by the Canadian Import Tribunal). A countervailing duty
can also be imposed by the Governor in Council on the advice of the
Minister of Finance where there is a subsidy, as determined by the Dep-
uty Minister, and where the GATT Committee of Signatories has au-
thorized the duty.
2. Summary of U.S. Law on Countervailing
The countervailing duty law complements the anti-dumping law by
providing a legal weapon to defend against a frequently used foreign un-
fair trade practice: the foreign subsidization of exports. If the foreign
manufacture, production or export of merchandise is being subsidized, a
domestic producer of a competing product may have a remedy under the
countervailing duty laws.
In 1979, Congress amended the countervailing duty laws to apply to
countries that are signatories to the Subsidy Code.2 °3 Section 303 of the
Tariff Act of 1930 still applies to exports from countries that are not
parties to the Agreement. Nevertheless, section 303 was amended to pro-
vide that countervailing duties shall be prescribed under regulations of
the administrating authority in accordance with the amended law. The
regulations prescribed by the administrating authority, apply the same
substantive and procedural law to section 303 and Title VII cases with
the exception that is discussed below.
In essence, the countervailing duty laws provide that the Secretary
of Commerce determines whether a country or citizen or a national
thereof is providing--directly or indirectly-a subsidy of the manufac-
ture, production or exportation of the merchandise imported into the
United States; and when required by Title VII, the ITC determines an
industry in the United States is materially injured, threatened with mate-
rial injury, or its establishment is materially retarded by reason of im-
ports of such merchandise, or be reason of sales of such merchandise,
then a countervailing duty equal to the amount of the net subsidy shall be
imposed upon such merchandise in addition to any other duty to which it
is subject. The subsidy may emanate from government or private
sources; however, all countervailing duty determinations to date have
arisen from foreign governmental actions and not private activities.
The term subsidy is defined in Title VII, as having the same mean-
ing as the term bounty or grant in section 303. The law indicates, how-
ever, that the term subsidy includes but is not limited to: the export
subsidies listed in Annex A to the Agreement; and a list of domestic
subsidies if provided to a specific enterprise or industry. The section
makes clear that a subsidy is a preferential benefit. An export subsidy is
a benefit which prefers exports over products sold domestically. A do-
mestic subsidy is a benefit provided to a specific industry or group of
industries in a manner inconsistent with normal commercial considera-
203 See 19 U.S.C. § 1671-1677g ("Title VII").
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tions. A nationwide government economic program, which is not an ex-
port subsidy, is not subject to countervailing duties by another
government. 2° This principal was narrowed in Bethlehem Steel Corp. v.
United States,2"' where the court drew a distinction between generally
available benefits which may bestow specific grants to specific enterprises.
One of the earliest, and still common forms, of government incentive
has been the granting of tax rebates to exporters. A principle followed by
the United States since the late 1800's was that the nonexcessive remis-
sion of an indirect tax by reason of the export of products did not consti-
tute a bounty or a grant. A remission was considered nonexcessive if it
did not exceed the amount of the tax paid or due. This view was upheld
in Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States.2°6 The Supreme Court found that
Congress intended to require countervailing duties to be applied to a net
export bounty; that is, a tax advantage beyond a remission of an indirect
tax upon export.
If the product is from a country that is a signatory to the Subsidy
Code, then Title VII requires the application of a material injury stan-
dard. In cases where the country is not a signatory, section 303 does not
require an injury determination. The ITC which makes the determina-
tion of injury, is required to consider, among other factors, the volume of
imports, the effect of the imports on prices, and the impact of imports on
domestic producers. Material injury is defined as harm which is not in-
consequential, immaterial, or unimportant. In addition, a causal connec-
tion must be shown between the subsidization and the material injury.
C. Other Import Relief Laws 2 °7
In addition to the anti-dumping and countervailing laws of the
United States, section 337(a) of the Tariff Act of 1930 prohibits:
Unfair methods of competition and unfair acts in the importation of
articles into the United States, or in their sale by the owner, importer,
consignee or agent of either, the effect or tendency of which is to de-
stroy or substantially injure an industry, efficiently and economically
operated, in the United States, or to prevent the establishment of such
an industry, or to restrain or monopolize trade and commerce in the
United States.20 8
This section has generally been used to attack alleged infringements of
U.S. patents, trademarks and copyrights by the importation of products.
Section 1105(a)(2) of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 amends section
204 See Carlisle Tire & Rubber Co. v. United States, 5 Ct. Int'l Trade 229, 564 F.Supp. 834
(1983).
205 Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. United States, 590 F. Supp. 1237 (1984).
206 Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 437 U.S. 443 (1978).
207 This discussion of s. 337 relies heavily on Thomas, J.C., "Competition Policy and
Canada-United States Comprehensive Trade Arrangement," Report for the Bureau of Competition
Policy, Department of Consumer and Corporate Affairs, pp. 70-75.
208 19 U.S.C. § 1337.
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337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 to require the ITC to not consider dumping
or subsidy complaints that are characterized as section 337 complaints.
Generally, section 337 requires the complainant to show: unfair
competition; the effect or tendency of which is to destroy or substantially
injure an industry; the industry is efficiently and economically operated;
and the industry is operated in the United States.
The standard for substantial injury is reasonably low. "[E]ven a rel-
atively small loss of sales may establish... the requisite injury....
The requirement of showing an effect or tendency can be satisfied by
showing that some component of the injury resulted from unfair im-
ports.21 0 That the industry is operated in the United States can appar-
ently be shown by domestic economic activity as evidenced by significant
value added domestically.211 Very little weight appears to be attached to
the requirement that the industry be efficiently and economically
operated.
Pending an investigation and upon a reasonable belief by the ITC
that there has been a violation of section 337, a temporary exclusion or-
der can be made that requires a bond to be posted with respect to goods
entering the United States. 12 If section 337 is found to have been vio-
lated, an exclusion order that bars entry of the goods into the United
States, or a cease and desist order with respect to the unfair acts can be
made.213 For policy reasons the President may override a remedy.214
Contrary to the competition policy perspective, section 337 can be
violated without an injury to competition.215 The penalty goes far be-
yond what is necessary or appropriate from a competition policy stand
point. 16
A safeguards provision permitted under the GATT Article XIX is
implemented in the United States by section 201 of the Trade Act of
1974.217 The purpose of the safeguards provision is to allow a gradual
and orderly adjustment to trade liberalization and to permit protection of
the national interest."1 ' Section 201 permits import relief to be granted
where an article is being imported into the United States in such in-
creased quantities as to be a substantial cause of serious injury, or threat
thereof.219
209 Bally/Midway Manufacturing Co. v. USITC, 714 F.2d 117, (Fed. Cir. 1983).
210 Id.
211 In re Certain Air-tight Cast Iron Stoves, Inv. No. 337-TA-69, USITC Pub. No. 1126 (1981)
at 11.
212 19 U.S.C. § 1337(c) (1976).
213 19 U.S.C. §§ 1337(d), (f)(1) (1976).
214 19 U.S.C. § 1337(g)(2) (1976).
215 See supra note 207, at 74.
216 Id. at 75.
217 Id. at 75-83.
218 Id. at 77.
219 19 U.S.C. § 2251 (1976).
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The ITC investigates a section 201 complaint, and if serious injury is
proven, it makes a recommendation to the President. The President,
subject to limited congressional review, decides whether the recommen-
dation should be implemented. Relief can be granted in the form of tariff
increases, quotas, financial assistance, and the negotiation of orderly
marketing agreements. The test of injury is made in the same way as in
an anti-dumping or countervailing duties case, but the standards for cau-
sation and for injury are higher. The imports must be a substantial,
rather than contributing, cause and there must be serious injury rather
than just material injury.
As far as competition policy considerations are concerned, they are
for the most part only considered by the President in his decision about
the ITC's recommendation. The President can consider "the effect of
import relief on consumers.., and on competition in the domestic mar-
kets for such articles. '221 Section 201 in its application otherwise is in-
consistent with competition policy.
D. Comparison of United States and Canadian Import Relief Laws
The Canadian anti-dumping laws set out in the Special Import Mea-
sure Act are quite similar to the below-home-market anti-dumping laws
in the U.S. Anti-dumping Law of 1912. There is, however, no Canadian
equivalent of the U.S. Anti-dumping Act of 1916 that deals with preda-
tory dumping. This difference is significant given current proposals to
make the U.S. Anti-dumping Act 1916 more effective.
As between the Special Import Measures Act and the U.S. Anti-
dumping Law of 1912, the time limits for determinations of dumping and
injury are similar as are the requirements. Timing in the United States is
somewhat more drawn out than it is in Canada; a final determination on
the existence of dumping may take up to 295 days from the filing of a
petition in the United States while a final determination may take up to
255 days in Canada. A final determination of injury may take up to 340
days from the filing of a petition in the United States while in Canada it
may take up to 285 days.
Both the Canadian Special Import Measure Act and the U.S. Anti-
dumping Law of 1912 require posting of security upon a preliminary de-
termination of dumping. Under the U.S. law, this preliminary determi-
nation generally can take up to 160 days; while under the Canadian law,
it generally can take up to ninety days. Security may have to be posted
sooner under the Canadian law than under the U.S. law.
The Canadian provisions allow for possible competition policy con-
siderations in that they permit public interest groups to be represented at
injury hearings. The U.S. Antidumping Law of 1912 does not allow for
220 19 U.S.C. § 2252(c)(4) (1976).
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representation by public interest groups nor does it provide in any other
way for consideration of competition policy.
Under the U.S. Anti-dumping Law of 1912, it is generally easier to
show material injury. For instance, in the United States a maximum vol-
ume of imports into the relevant region of 4.5% has been accepted as
significant, 221 whereas in Canada a volume of imports of 8% has been
found not to be material. 2
Generally, the Canadian Anti-dumping Act,223 now the Special Im-
port Measures Act, has been ineffective at discouraging imports from the
United States while the U.S. Anti-dumping Act of 1912 has been effective
at discouraging Canadian exports to the United States.
221 See supra note 143.
222 Refined Sugar, ADT-8-84, July 23, 1984.
223 R.S.C. C.15 (1970), as amended; repealed S.C. 1983-84, ch. 25, s. 110.
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